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Joint Action, Intended Meaning and
(Statutory) Interpretation

RICHARD EKINS*

SHIPS THAT PASS IN THE NIGHT
Smith and Jones (singular) is an exporting firm, an agent. It is formed
by two partners, Smith and Jones (plural), acting jointly and is thus a
small purposive group. Mary is the firm’s employee. She forms part of
the group insofar as her acts will be acts of the firm. Mary acts on
written instructions, which means that Smith and Jones jointly direct Mary
by way of instructions to which they both agree, the agreement of each
partner being signified by each signing a memorandum.
Smith and Jones jointly stand to Mary as superior to inferior. The firm
has a decision-making structure—a standing intention to form further, particular
intentions—to this extent. Smith and Jones stand to one another as equals.
The firm is to this extent a simple group in which joint action and intention
requires unanimity on the part of Smith and Jones. This is the default for
group action. Smith and Jones might adopt a rule—a standing intention—that
each would be committed to the other’s reasonable misunderstandings of
proposals he makes. The rule that Mary’s instructions are only operative if
signed by both partners might suggest this. However, this rule is just as
readily understood as requiring, and constituting, a written record of (true)
agreement.
Mary has been instructed to undertake a certain course of action when
Smith and Jones have formed the joint intention that she shall act in this
way and when that joint intention is conveyed to Mary by way of written
*
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instructions. The question in this case is whether Smith and Jones have
formed a joint intention and whether they have conveyed it to Mary by
uttering the semantic content of the memorandum in the context in which
it was uttered. Or, alternatively, the question is whether they have (inadvertently)
conveyed some other course of action to Mary by way of their utterance,
which makes it intelligible to say that Mary has been instructed to act in
this way.
The question of what Mary has been instructed to do turns on Smith and
Jones’s joint intention, if any, in using the phrase “the ship Peerless, which
is bound for Athens.” That is, what plan of action (again, if any) do Smith
and Jones jointly intend Mary to adopt because of their memorandum? The
intended meaning of the phrase aims to articulate that plan, but it is the
plan that is decisive.
It is tempting to say that there is no joint intention because there is
only the appearance of agreement, an appearance which dissolves when
one realizes the mistake that Smith and Jones each have made. When
Smith proposes (or accepts) shipment by way of “the ship Peerless, bound
for Athens,” he takes for granted that this means the only Peerless of
which he is aware, namely the ship by that name in Plymouth. When
Jones hears this proposal, or if he proposes shipment by way of “the ship
Peerless,” he takes for granted that this means the ship by that name in
Southampton. Neither man used the formulation to distinguish the ship
from any other ship called “Peerless,” precisely because no such confusion
was anticipated. Likewise, neither partner was intending to convey a class
—“ships called Peerless”—while merely expecting that Mary would apply
the class to the ship owned by his brother (or sister). That there was more
than one ship named Peerless, such that the formulation would not pick
out one ship only, was not anticipated.
If Smith had proposed “the ship Peerless” intending to convey “the ship
of that name based in Plymouth (and owned by my brother),” and Jones
had agreed, intending “the ship Peerless” to mean “the ship of that name
based in Southampton (and owned by my sister),” then there would simply
have been no agreement. The two partners would not have formed a joint
intention about what Mary was to do. Smith and Jones would have been
talking past each other, as if, echoing Dworkin, they had agreed to meet
by the bank, with one referring to the river’s edge and the other to the
financial institution. Even in such a case, however, Mary might have been
instructed to act. Insofar as Mary knew that Smith and Jones had not truly
agreed on a course of action, she would not have been instructed to do
anything. Their signature would not change this analysis for it would not
transmute the absence of joint intention into a true act of the partnership.
But if Mary had not known this then she would reasonably have understood
their intended meaning—their joint intention—to be to ship textiles on
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“the Peerless.” In that case, she would have been instructed, per the
standing intention of the firm that she should act as the partners seem to
have directed, to make the shipment by way of “the ship Peerless,” an
instruction that does not distinguish between the two ships. It follows that
her instructions would require shipment on a ship, but either would do.
However, the better analysis is that Smith and Jones truly act on the
joint intention that Mary should make the shipment by way of “the ship
Peerless, bound for Athens,” an intention that does not distinguish
between the two ships that bear that name.
If the point of the shipment, for the firm (what each partner will admit
to the other, what each has agreed to do with the other), is to ship textiles
to a buyer in Athens, then their further, private intentions (what each
“wants” to happen) are irrelevant. They are agreed that the shipment
should be made on “the ship Peerless, bound for Athens.” They have
chosen this means to the end of delivering the shipment, but the means
they have chosen, which they have directed Mary to adopt, turns out to be
insufficiently specific to settle between the two ships. Imagine that Smith
and Jones had no private intentions or plans: would this imprecision of
means then matter? No, because their assumption that there was only one
Peerless, based in Plymouth or Southampton, would be irrelevant to the
course of action they intended the firm to undertake, namely, shipping
textiles to a buyer in Athens. It would only be if the cost of transport to
Plymouth or Southampton, or the terms demanded by the relevant ship,
were different that the question “which Peerless?” would be at all relevant
to the partnership’s action.
The importance of this analysis is that the private intentions do not
matter precisely because they are private, that is, not common to Smith
and Jones and thus not apt to frame their joint intention. Smith and Jones
may each want the private (family) gain that follows from shipment being
by way of the Peerless each has in mind, but they have not put to the other
partner a course of action in which the partnership (the exporting firm)
agrees to act in a way that clearly has, let alone openly accepts, this side
effect. Hence, each partner should understand himself to have agreed to
a course of action in which the joint intention is that the shipment simply
will proceed by way of “the ship Peerless, bound for Athens.” One might
speculate that either partner would have withheld his agreement if it were
clear that the Peerless in question was not the one owned by his brother
or sister. Perhaps, but regretting one’s agreement is not the same as
having failed to agree. One might more plausibly speculate that both
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partners would resist the conclusion that they had failed to agree, if for
both the point of their joint action is to make a shipment to a buyer in
Athens, with the mode of carriage being relevant to the partnership only
insofar as it bears on the terms of carriage.
This is a hard case because it involves reflection on how “the ship
Peerless, bound for Athens” stands in the joint intention of Smith and
Jones. If each partner truly intended that formulation to be understood to
mean “the Peerless in Plymouth” or “the Peerless in Southampton,” such
that the proposed plan was to employ that particular ship and no other,
then there would have been no joint intention. If Mary had been aware of
a failure to agree then she would not have been instructed to do anything.
But if she had not been aware, then Smith and Jones would have instructed
her, in a secondary sense, to make the shipment by way of either Peerless.
However, there are good reasons to think that the plan of action to which
the partners have agreed, which they direct Mary to implement, is
shipment by way of the Peerless, bound for Athens, a coherent but, it turns
out, underspecified instruction. The partnership’s failure to anticipate that
there are two ships named Peerless does not mean that Smith and Jones
have not formed and conveyed to Mary their joint intention. Their joint
intention would not settle on which Peerless the shipment should be made,
but it certainly would settle that shipment is to be made on “the ship
Peerless, bound for Athens.”
LET’S CALL THE WHOLE THING OFF (YOU SAY TOMATO, I SAY TOMATO)
No judge may safely apply a statute he or she has not read. However,
the precise statutory text is not before this court. What is agreed is that the
statute imposes a new tax on “imported fruit but not imported vegetables.”
The question for this court to decide is whether the tax applies to a
shipment of tomatoes and kiwis. This requires the court to determine
whether “fruit” should be understood to have been used in its culinary or
botanical sense. If the former, then the tax does not apply to tomatoes; if
the latter, it does apply. (On either reading the tax applies to the shipment
of kiwifruit.) This is a question about the meaning that the legislature
intended to convey in enacting the statute. The legislature introduced a
new rule into the law of Lex, a rule that imposes a tax either on “fruit” in
the culinary sense or “fruit” in the botanical sense, but that does not
impose a tax on vegetables.
Some evidence about legislative history has been placed before this
court, to which I turn below. However, the distinction the statute draws
on its face, insofar as I am able to determine this without the statutory text
itself, answers the question before the court. In distinguishing between
imported fruit and vegetables, the legislature has made clear its intention
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to impose a tax on “fruit” in the culinary sense and not in the botanical
sense. No rational legislature would utter this text intending to convey
the proposition that “fruit” is to be understood in its botanical sense.
If the statute imposed a tax on imported fruit and was silent on vegetables
then it might be an open question whether the legislature used the term
“fruit” in its culinary or botanical sense. But in drawing a distinction
between fruit and vegetables this question dissolves, for no rational
lawmaker, or language user, would draw this distinction and intend “fruit”
to bear its botanical meaning. The reason is that the botanical meaning of
“fruit” extends well into the class of vegetables, at least as the latter are
understood in a culinary sense. There is no stable botanical meaning of
vegetables that might rationally be adopted together with a botanical
meaning of “fruit,” unless one simply refers to edible plant matter—but
this would include fruit. While “fruit” may in some contexts be ambiguous
between botanical and culinary senses, when used in contrast to vegetables,
it would be extremely unlikely to be used in the former sense. One could
understand vegetables to include all edible plant matter save for fruit
understood in the botanical sense, but that would be plausible only if there
was some reason to read “fruit” thus. There is no such reason and on the
contrary this reading attributes to the legislature an unusual intended
meaning of “vegetables”, which would exclude not only tomatoes,
but also peppers, pumpkins, cucumbers, peas, stringbeans, eggplant, okra,
olives, avocado, corn, zucchini, beans, and chickpeas. The legislature did
not classify each of these types of plant matter as fruits or vegetables in
the course of enacting this statute, but the need for customs and excise
officials to classify them must have informed its choice of language.
I note that the statute includes the proviso that “There shall be no
discrimination among types of fruit in the levying of this tax.” This
enactment neither requires nor forbids reading “fruit” in its culinary or
botanical sense. On the contrary it takes for granted that such a sense has
already been intended and then prohibits discrimination within the class.
That is, I read the proviso to forbid those who are charged with levying
the tax from making special provision for certain types of fruit (apples,
say), to which, by hypothesis, the tax otherwise would apply. Perhaps my
reading of this proviso is unintelligible, but without seeing the rest of the
statute it would seem not, and it would be odd indeed to understand this
provision as somehow establishing that “fruit” was intended to be
understood in its botanical rather than its culinary sense. It would be
highly implausible to try to convey (clarify?) that fruit is used in its
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botanical sense by way of this provision. No rational legislator would
think that it changed the operative provision of the tax.
It follows that I conclude that the legislature—as the rational language
user and lawmaker that uttered this semantic content intending to convey
a certain meaning and thus change the law in the ways that it intended
them to change—intended to use “fruit” in its culinary sense. There is no
need to have reference to the legislative history to understand the
legislature’s act. I would not even take the legislative history that has been
provided in this case to be relevant to the question before the court, or to
be open in principle for this court to consider, unless I am required by the
law of Lex to have reference to it. I shall proceed on the assumption I am
so required.
What has been put before the court is a thin account of the legislative
history, which confirms the risks of referring to it. The history is silent
on which legislators initiated the legislation or how or why it was
understood as it was, apart from assurances falsely made by the legislative
aide.
The joint intention of the legislators turns on what proposal was open
to legislators and adopted by way of the procedures of the assembly,
including majority vote. Legislators do not stipulate the meaning of a
proposal by voting for it; rather, their vote makes it the case that the
legislature (singular) adopts a proposal that has the meaning it reasonably
appears to legislators (plural) to have. It is thus rather important how the
third of legislators who voted against the tax understood it. I reject the
implication that their understanding is irrelevant because they opposed the
proposal. On the contrary, they may have opposed it precisely because
they saw that it was a proposal to tax fruit in its culinary sense, or, perhaps,
in its botanical sense. The point of uncovering how the minority understood
the proposal is not to count heads, as if the meaning of the legislation were
settled by some kind of meta-vote about meaning. Rather, the point would
be to discern what proposal was reasonably understood to have been
before legislators for adoption. It is for this reason that it matters who
moved the proposal—and why—and how they were reasonably understood.
The partial legislative history that has been put before this court implies
that the legislative aide simply manipulated two subgroups of legislators
into understanding the legislative proposal in incompatible ways. With
respect, this is less than compelling as an account of legislative dynamics.
The premise of the dispute, insofar as it concerns legislative history, is
that there were different understandings of the proposal put to the legislators
(plural), such that the subgroups of legislators who made up the majority
simply acted on different understandings. However, the legislature is not
a simple group. It does not act only when the legislators agree. The
legislature is a complex group that has a standing intention to act on the
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proposals that are open to all legislators which are adopted on majority
vote. Even when some legislators fail to understand the proposal that is
before them, the legislature nonetheless acts on the intention that the
proposal makes out (a plan for lawmaking change articulated in some
meaning-content).
It is noteworthy that the different subgroups of legislators (with the
exception of the minority) are said to have been assured either that the
term “fruit” bears its botanical meaning or its culinary meaning. How
would the legislative aide have given this assurance, save by simply
asserting that this is what he or she intended in drafting the proposal? But
this assertion would not suffice. Any meaningful assurance would need
to consist in reasons why the proposal is better understood in one way or
another, why some understanding is or should be common across the
legislature, which would turn in part on how the text would be likely to be
understood, by this court and other subjects of the law, if enacted by the
legislature itself. For the reasons given above, I can see how assurances
might plausibly have been given to those who would vote for the proposal
if it imposed a tax on imported fruit in the culinary sense. I cannot see
how similar assurances could have been provided to those who would
only vote for a tax on fruit in the botanical sense.
Once this division amongst the legislators is known, the problem cannot
easily be contained. It would have been irrational for the so-called
“tomato-haters” to have assumed that “fruit” had its botanical meaning.
One might say that it would also have been unsafe for the “tomato-lovers”
to have assumed the opposite, but they had the support of the rationality
of language use, context, and perhaps also the understanding of the voting
minority. Legislative coalitions do fragment at times or misunderstand
one another, but it is doubtful whether this question would matter to both
subgroups, the disagreement be known, and yet both be confident that the
proposal is as they understand it. The obvious answer would have been
to settle the point by way of an amendment.
The legislative history implies that the legislators took some remedial
measures, per the proviso, after seeing the legislative draft, which would
imply that they were not so confident about how the proposal before them
for enactment would be understood. The proviso does not strengthen the
argument that fruit is used in its culinary sense, but can readily be explained
on other grounds. As noted above, the proviso would be an inept means
to reject the culinary sense. If the tomato haters understood the proviso
to be a means to ensure that the tax applies to tomatoes without saying as
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much, or without clearly adopting the (botanical) sense of “fruit” that
would make the point clear, then they tried to legislate without forming a
joint intention with other legislators, which is hopeless. That is to say,
they may have misunderstood the act in which they joined and/or tried to
enact more (or something different) than what was open to and adopted
by other legislators.
My duty is to uphold the law the legislature enacted, which turns on its
intended meaning and lawmaking intention. I can readily infer this
without any analysis of legislative history, and the risk of mishandling
such materials (or reviewing only a very partial account) is confirmed by
this case. However, even if I consider the materials, I find no reason to
conclude that the legislative act misfires, such that there is no legislative
intent, or to conclude that the legislature has somehow left open to this
court, or anyone else, the meaning of “fruit.” I therefore hold that the
legislature intended “fruit” to bear its culinary meaning and the tax does
not apply to tomatoes.
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